Microsoft Office Application Spawns Shell or Script Process (E8-03)

E8-03 — Configure Microsoft Office Macro Settings ML1 high experimental
More E8-03 rules
Description
Detects a Microsoft Office application spawning a shell, scripting host, or reconnaissance process. This is a primary indicator of a malicious macro executing a payload — a technique that E8-03 (Macro Settings) is explicitly designed to prevent. Fires regardless of macro signing status; any Office→shell execution warrants review.
Rule Source (Sigma YAML)
title: Microsoft Office Application Spawns Shell or Script Process (E8-03)
id: c9deb7bd-46ff-4823-8c2d-953e874e1ae3
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a Microsoft Office application spawning a shell, scripting host, or
    reconnaissance process. This is a primary indicator of a malicious macro executing
    a payload — a technique that E8-03 (Macro Settings) is explicitly designed to prevent.
    Fires regardless of macro signing status; any Office→shell execution warrants review.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
    - https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/essential-cyber-security/essential-eight/essential-eight-maturity-model
author: Roni Biju
date: 2026-03-05
modified: 2026-03-05
tags:
    - e8.control.03
    - e8.maturity.ml1
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.initial_access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.EXE'
            - '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            - '\MSACCESS.EXE'
            - '\MSPUB.EXE'
            - '\ONENOTE.EXE'
    selection_suspicious_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
    filter_known_good:
        # Some enterprise add-ins legitimately spawn processes
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'splwow64'
    condition: selection_parent and selection_suspicious_child and not filter_known_good
falsepositives:
    - Specific legacy enterprise add-ins that spawn helper processes
    - Print spooler interactions
level: high
custom:
    e8_control: E8-03
    e8_maturity: ML1
    e8_bypass_technique: Malicious VBA macro spawning shell/script process
    false_positive_rate: low
    tuning_notes: |
        In environments with macro signing (ML2+) this should be near-zero FP.
        At ML1 (macros enabled for all) FP rate is slightly higher due to
        legacy add-ins. Build a suppression list from initial baselining period.
Tuning Notes
In environments with macro signing (ML2+) this should be near-zero FP. At ML1 (macros enabled for all) FP rate is slightly higher due to legacy add-ins. Build a suppression list from initial baselining period.
E8 Control
Min. Maturity
ML1
Severity
high
FP Rate
low
Log Source
windows / process_creation
Rule ID
c9deb7bd-46ff-4823-8c2d-953e874e1ae3
File
rules/e8-03-office-macros/e8_03_office_spawns_shell_process.yml
Bypass Technique
Malicious VBA macro spawning shell/script process
ATT&CK Techniques
False Positives
  • Specific legacy enterprise add-ins that spawn helper processes
  • Print spooler interactions
Emulation Scripts
emulation/e8-03/Invoke-MacroEmulation.ps1

Run in a Windows lab VM only. No real payload is executed.